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Abstract
Background: In response to global concerns about the largest Ebola virus disease (EVD), outbreak to-date in West
Africa documented healthcare associated transmission and the risk of global spread, the International Society of
Chemotherapy (ISC) Infection Control Working Group created an Ebola Infection Control Readiness Checklist to
assess the preparedness of institutions around the globe. We report data from the electronic checklist that was
disseminated to medical professionals from October to December 2014 and identify action needed towards better
preparedness levels.
Findings: Data from 192 medical professionals (one third from Africa) representing 125 hospitals in 45 countries
around the globe were obtained through a specifically developed electronic survey. The survey contained 76
specific questions in 7 major sections: Administrative/operational support; Communications; Education and audit;
Human resources, Supplies, Infection Prevention and Control practices and Clinical management of patients. The
majority of respondents were infectious disease specialists/infection control consultants/clinical microbiologists
(75; 39 %), followed by infection control professionals (59; 31 %) and medical doctors of other specialties (17; 9 %).
Nearly all (149; 92 %) were directly involved in Ebola preparedness activities. Whilst, 54 % indicated that their
hospital would need to handle suspected and proven Ebola cases, the others would subsequently transfer
suspected cases to a specialized centre.
Conclusion: The results from our survey reveal that the general preparedness levels for management of potentially
suspected cases of Ebola virus disease is only partially adequate in hospitals. Hospitals designated for admitting EVD
suspected and proven patients had more frequently implemented Infection Control preparedness activities than
hospitals that would subsequently transfer potential EVD cases to other centres. Results from this first international
survey provide a framework for future efforts to improve hospital preparedness worldwide.
Keywords: Ebola virus disease, EVD outbreak, EVD preparedness, Personal protective equipment
Introduction
On 8th August, 2014 the World Health Organization
(WHO) declared the Ebola epidemic to be a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) [1, 2]. The
Ebola virus disease outbreak had an unprecedented rate of
increase with 22,500 reported cases and nearly 9000 deaths
as of 4 February 2015 [1]. Furthermore, cases exported to
other countries made this a global concern and both a
medical and public health crisis [3]. WHO recommended
all nations to implement public health measures to re-
spond to the suspected and confirmed EVD cases and for
the international community to strengthen their support
towards the affected countries [4, 5]. As pointed out in the
Lancet [5], however, there are no incentives or sanctions
in place for failing to build capacity to implement such
measures. Whilst, infections related to cross-transmission,
similar to the ones seen in Dallas, USA and Spain, will
probably remain sporadic in the more developed re-
gions around the globe, the widespread transmission in
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healthcare facilities in the three countries most badly af-
fected emphasizes the need for hospitals to be prepared.
It is imperative to understand the current situation in
the diverse healthcare facilities globally, in order to be
better prepared for Ebola and any future emerging in-
fectious diseases.
This survey is an initiative of the International Soci-
ety of Chemotherapy (ISC) - Infection Control Work-
ing Group, to better understand the infection control
needs and preparedness levels of various ISC members
found globally.
Methods
The ISC infection control working group is represented
from officers coming from around 40 different countries
around the globe. An Infection Control readiness check-
list, based on a draft checklist from the Infection Control
Association (Singapore), was compiled by members of the
ISC Infection Control Working Group. Following this, an
electronic version of the survey was created. Members
were asked to further disseminate the survey to other col-
leagues/healthcare workers in their countries or networks.
Copies of this survey were made available to participants
at the Infection Control African Network conference orga-
nized in Zimbabwe (November 2014). Whilst, there is an
optimal representation of ISC infection control working
group officers from Singapore, Australia and Switzerland
amongst other countries conversely, there is no group rep-
resentative from Spain or West African countries.
In addition, the link to the questionnaire was circu-
lated via email and printed copies of the questionnaire
were also made available for those without access to a
computer/internet. Demographic data included: hospital
name, city and country. In addition, the questionnaire
determined whether hospitals would need to handle
suspected and proven EVD cases as compared to only
“suspected” cases which would then be subsequently
transferred to a specialized centre. The section addressing
administrative/operational support specifically assessed
alert notification systems in the case of Ebola/emerging
viruses and surveillance reports on unexpected deaths or
unexplained illnesses. The questionnaire also assessed
whether communication mechanisms and visual tools are
in place, to provide regular updates to healthcare workers.
In addition, respondents were asked whether training and
competency assessments on the use and removal of per-
sonal protective equipment (PPE) sequence take place at
regular intervals. Additional questions assessed infection
prevention measures and availability of supplies (e.g.
evidence based guidelines, isolation rooms, negative
pressure, ventilation, PPE, spill kits, handling of labora-
tory specimens, waste management). Questions pertain-
ing to the clinical management of patients addressed
laboratory diagnostics for the detection of EVD, intensive
care supportive facilities, renal replacement therapy and a
process for fast tracking accessibility to any new therapeu-
tics for the treatment of EVD. Respondents were asked to
select the most appropriate answer from the options pro-
vided in each question: ‘in place’; ‘in progress’; and ‘action
needed’. At the end of the survey an open-ended question
was dedicated to comments from participants. The survey
completion period was active between October and De-
cember 2014. For those interested in checking their own
institution, a complete version of the questionnaire is
available in the Additional file 1 of this manuscript.
Analysis
The analysis was performed using descriptive statistics for
the survey data. SPSS version 19.0 (IBM Corp, Armonk,
NY) was used for data analysis and significant differences
between the groups were analyzed by using the Chi-
squared test of association. Subsequently, a p-value of less
than 0.05 was considered as significant. Comparisons were
made between hospitals that would need to admit and
manage patients with suspected EVD and those that
would provide immediate care and subsequently trans-
fer suspected EVD cases to another specialised centre.
Results
Participants characteristics
The 192 respondents represented 125 hospitals in 45
countries around the globe, with the largest proportion
originating from Europe (63; 33 %) and Africa (60; 31 %).
Among the remaining respondents were professionals
from Australia (19; 10 %), South America (17; 9 %), Asia
(16; 8 %) and North America (3; 2 %) as presented in Fig. 1.
More than half of the respondents’ (83; 54 %), were from
hospitals that would admit and manage EVD cases. The
remaining 75 respondents (46 %) were from hospitals that
would provide immediate care only for suspected cases
and then transfer these patients to other specialized cen-
ters. In the remainder (30) the role of their hospital was
not clear. Out of 192 healthcare workers responding to the
questionnaire, 18 did not provide information regarding
their medical profession. The majority of the remaining
174 respondents were infectious disease specialists/in-
fection control consultants/clinical microbiologists (75;
39 %), followed by infection control professionals (59;
31 %) and medical doctors of other specialties (17; 9 %).
The remaining respondents were nurses (12; 6 %), insti-
tutional safety officers (3; 2 %), pharmacists (3; 2 %) and
other professions (5; 3 %) (Fig. 2). The majority of respon-
dents from the African continent originated from the
southern region (n = 49); there were 4 from central Africa,
3 from north Africa, 3 from west Africa and only 1 re-
spondent from east Africa.
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Administrative and operational support
More than half of the hospitals that would admit and
manage suspected EVD patients, have established Infection
Prevention and Control (IPC) programs and personnel,
represented in the hospitals’ operations team preparing for
Ebola/other emerging viruses (57; 70 %). Less than half had
daily surveillance reports circulated through hospital oper-
ations on unexpected deaths in hospitals (30; 36 %). A
good number of respondents from hospitals that would
treat EVD patients (30; 37 %) as well as the other hospitals
that would transfer suspected cases to specialized centers
(29; 41 %) stated that action is needed to have a system in
place which monitors clusters of patients and staff with un-
explained fever. Most “Frontline” healthcare workers were
aware (56; 68 %) of the surveillance systems and the notifi-
cation process upon identification of a suspected EVD
case, while others felt that this was still a work in progress
(15; 18 %) or something for which action is needed (11;
13 %). The majority of hospitals (57; 70 %) had guidelines
in place for implementation of appropriate measures upon
the notification of a suspected case of EVD (Table 1).
Communication
Communication and provision of information on Fre-
quently Asked Questions (FAQ’s) in response to the EVD
outbreak have been implemented for the majority of the
hospitals that would admit EVD suspected cases (45;
59 %). Visual tools such as PPE teaching posters, videos in
respective languages are available and were disseminated
in 29 hospitals (38 %), whilst 28 (36 %) are in progress and
17 (22 %) need action to be taken. Internal communica-
tion mechanisms are in place in 42 (55 %) hospitals, pro-
viding regular updates to healthcare workers whilst, for 18
(24 %) action is still required (Table 2).
Education and audit
Preparedness activities in response to the EVD outbreak
incorporated education and training. When EVD admitting
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hospitals were compared to those transferring suspect pa-
tients, almost half (41; 49 %) of the hospitals that would
manage EVD patients had plans in place to conduct regu-
lar in-house training, to test that the necessary systems are
put in place whilst, in 18 (22 %) hospitals this had not been
implemented and 20 (24 %) hospitals were working on it
(p < 0.01). In more than half of admitting hospitals (41;
57 %), training was conducted periodically to ensure
healthcare workers’ competency and safety in donning/
doffing PPE procedures whereas 13 hospitals (18 %)
lacked such procedures and in addition, 16 (22 %) hos-
pitals were currently working on it (p < 0.01).
Evidence of training activities to ensure healthcare
workers are informed about standard precautions was in
place in the majority (52 (71 %)) of hospitals that would
admit EVD patients; 37 hospitals (56 %) would not admit
patients. Data pertaining to visitors and their awareness of
cough etiquette and hand hygiene revealed comparable
results between hospitals that would admit EVD patients
(24; 33 % action needed, 26; 35 % in progress) and hospi-
tals indicating not to admit patients (19; 29 % action
needed, 20; 30 % in progress). The details are to be found
in Table 3.
Human resource
There are clearly gaps in human resource policy and in-
frastructure. A sick leave policy for healthcare workers
who have sick family members is in place in 21 (30 %)
hospitals and action is needed in 34 (49 %) and the
remaining is work in progress (6 (9 %)). Subsequently, a
plan is in place to support healthcare workers with tem-
porary accommodation for purpose of quarantine during
an outbreak in only 14 hospitals (20 %) and action is
needed in this matter in 33 hospitals (48 %). Provision of
psychological support to medical professionals who were
exposed to or were potential suspected cases of EVD
Table 1 Administrative operational support
Hospitals that (would) take
care of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Administrative/Operational support In place Action needed In place Action needed
IPC is represented in the Hospital Operations Team preparing for EVD 57 (69.5) 4 (4.9) 46 (63.9) 3 (4.2) 0.7
There is a notification system to alert the hospital Operations and Infection
Control of suspect cases of EVD
61 (73.5) 7 (8.4) 51 (70.8) 3 (4.2) 0.4
Daily surveillance reports are circulated on unexpected deaths in hospital 20 (24.1) 30 (36.1) 15 (20.8) 23 (31.9) 0.62
Daily surveillance reports are circulated on unexplained illness in travelers 30 (36.6) 26 (31.7) 19 (26.4) 25 (34.7) 0.5
“Frontline” staff are aware of the surveillance systems and know how to
notify suspect cases of EVD
56 (68.3) 11 (13.4) 43 (60.6) 6 (8.5) 0.1
There are plans in place to conduct regular in-house exercises to test
systems put in place
41 (49.4) 18 (21.7) 20 (27.8) 14 (19.4) < 0.01
A policy is in place to implement appropriate measures upon the
notification of the first suspect case in the institution
57 (70.4) 12 (14.8) 48 (66.7) 11 (15.3) 0.9
A system is in place to monitor clusters of patients and staff with
unexplained fever
27 (33.3) 30 (37.0) 19 (26.8) 29 (40.8) 0.67
Table 2 Communication
Hospitals that (would) take
care of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Communication In place Action needed In place Action needed
FAQs on infectious diseases of interest e.g. Ebola virus disease (EVD)
are disseminated to all staff in the healthcare facility in particular to
frontline staff
45 (59.2) 14 (18.4) 33 (46.5) 19 (26.8) 0.28
PPE teaching posters, slides and/or video are available in appropriate
languages and disseminated
29 (38.2) 17 (22.4) 28 (39.4) 22 (30.9) 0.45
Drafts on public messaging with respect to screening, ward shutdown,
etc. are in readiness
28 (36.8) 25 (32.9) 9 (12.7) 30 (42.3) < 0.01
A draft press release for the first case of EVD identified in the hospital
is prepared
19 (25.3) 27 (36.0) 10 (14.1) 40 (56.3) 0.03
Internal communication mechanism is in place to provide regular
updates to staff
42 (55.3) 18 (23.7) 37 (52.8) 17 (24.3) 1
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was in place in 16 hospitals (23 %) and 40 hospitals
needed to take action on this issue (58 %). In hospitals
indicating that they would admit EVD patients, the fit
test for the N95 respirator was in place in only 21 (30 %)
hospitals, whilst 23 (33 %) needed action and others 21
(30 %) were still in progress (Table 4).
Supplies
The majority of the respondents from hospitals that
would admit EVD patients stated that, PPE (i.e. masks,
gloves, gowns, eye protection) was easily accessible to
healthcare workers particularly in frontline areas (55,
89 %). However, only 37 respondents (54 %) indicated that
a process is in place for regular checks (i.e. expiry date) on
PPE items to ensure their appropriate usage. The majority
of participants, identified that for scarce supplies of
PPE, a system is in place (49; 72 %) to prioritize health-
care workers caring for affected cases (Table 5).
Essential support services
Essential support activities in response to the EVD out-
break were in place for methods of cleaning and disinfect-
ing healthcare facilities. In 51 (75) of the respondents,
disposal of medical and non-medical solid waste are in ac-
cordance with national standards, cleaning and disinfec-
tion is done for reusable equipment between patient use
Table 3 Education & Audit
Hospitals that (would) take
care of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Education and Audit In place Action needed In place Action needed
There is evidence of training to ensure all healthcare workers (HCWs) know
about standard precautions and isolation precautions
52 (71.2) 4 (5.4) 37 (56.1) 6 (9.1) 0.07
HCWs are aware of cough etiquette and hand hygiene 61 (83.5) 3 (4.1) 53 (80.3) 3 (4.5) 0.88
Patients are aware of cough etiquette and hand hygiene 30 (41.1) 21 (28.8) 28 (42.4) 19 (28.8) 0.97
Visitors are aware of cough etiquette and hand hygiene 20 (27.4) 24 (33.0) 24 (36.4) 19 (28.8) 0.52
There are training teams in place who can rapidly train all staff in hospital
on infection control
46 (63.0) 10 (13.7) 35 (53.0) 9 (13.6) 0.4
There are audit teams who can audit infection control independent of
the IPC teams
24 (33.8) 28 (39.4) 16 (25.0) 35 (54.7) 0.22
Training and competency assessment are done for the designated teams at
the high risk areas on use of PPE and its removal sequence
36 (50.0) 12 (16.7) 27 (41.5) 15 (28.1) 0.38
Training and exercises are conducted periodically to ensure staff competency
and safety in use of PPE
41 (56.9) 13 (18.1) 22 (33.8) 13 (20.0) < 0.01
Where applicable, training and competency assessment is planned for staff
handling human waste management e.g. the use of the autoclave machine
26 (36.1) 22 (30.6) 20 (30.8) 15 (23.1) 0.74
Table 4 Human resource
Hospitals that (would) take
care of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Human resource In place Action needed In place Action needed
All frontline healthcare workers with contact with patients have completed
the mask fit test with a N95 respirator
21 (30.0) 23 (32.9) 11 (17.7) 30 (48.4) 0.13
Policy is in place for HCWs who are not well or exposed to infectious agents
to be given sick leave without penalty
34 (47.9) 24 (33.8) 32 (51.6) 20 (32.3) 0.84
A sickleave policy for staff who have sick family members/dependents is
in place
21 (30.0) 34 (48.6) 19 (31.7) 28 (46.7) 0.96
Designated teams are appointed to high demand/ risk services (e.g. infectious
disease wards, emergency & ICUs) to ensure that all the necessary clinical
services are covered in the event of restriction of some HCWs from clinical
service due to isolation, treatment and/or quarantine
27 (38.6) 22 (31.4) 11 (17.7) 26 (41.9) 0.05
A plan is in place to meet needs of staff for temporary accommodation for
purpose of quarantine during an outbreak
14 (20.3) 33 (47.8) 11 (17.7) 37 (59.7) 0.1
A plan is in place to provide postexposure prophylaxis or vaccination if this is
available for the emerging infectious disease
25 (35.7) 27 (38.6) 22 (35.5) 25 (40.3) 0.94
A plan is in place for providing psychological support (professional counseling)
to staff who were exposed, who were suspects or have loved ones who were
EVD patients
16 (23.2) 40 (57.9) 12 (19.3) 35 (56.4) 0.5
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in 52 hospitals (76 %) and plans exist for safe disposal of
human body waste in 44 hospitals (66 %) (Table 6).
Infection prevention and control practices
Preparedness for infection prevention and control activ-
ities in response to the EVD outbreak included availability
of isolation rooms which were in place in 46 hospitals
(69 %), isolation rooms with ≥12 air changes per hour
were in place in only 38 hospitals (56 %) and required ac-
tion in 22 hospitals (33 %). Additionally, when isolation
rooms from hospitals in Africa were compared to those in
all other countries participating in this survey a significant
statistical difference was identified (p < 0.01) where more
than half of the isolation rooms 26 (55 %) in African coun-
tries were not in line with isolation room standards.
Auditing of compliance to IPC guidelines related to hand-
ling laboratory specimens is in place in 30 hospitals (45 %)
and requires action for implementation in 16 hospitals
(24 %). Similar numbers are seen in food preparation as
well as cleaning and laundry. Availability of alcohol hand
rub agents at point of care areas for use by healthcare
workers was assessed and compared between Africa and
other continents and a significant statistical difference was
identified, with considerable action needed, particularly in
Africa (48 % and 2.8 % respectively). A policy is in place
for the safe management of the patient following death;
including use of body bag, cleaning of the corpse in 32
hospitals (48 %) whilst, it required action in 19 hospitals
(29 %) (Table 7). This is a concern as EVD is well docu-
mented to be transmitted during burials and funerals.
Clinical management of patients
Clinicians’ preparedness in recognizing the characteristics
of patients suffering from EVD, especially in EVD admit-
ting hospitals were compared to non-admitting hospitals.
In 37 hospitals (56 %), laboratories had protocols in place
for the diagnosis of fever in travelers returning from West
Africa so as to promptly rule out malaria and typhoid. In-
tensive care facilities are available and in place for patients
with suspected and probable EVD, providing supportive
care in 31 (48 %) in hospitals that would admit patients.
Renal replacement therapy is in place for patients with
Table 5 Supplies
Hospitals that (would) take care
of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Supplies In place Action needed In place Action needed
Personal protective equipment (PPE) (i.e. medical/surgical masks,
gloves, gowns, eye protection) is easily accessible to staff especially
in frontline areas
55 (80.9) 7 (10.3) 42 (68.9) 6 (9.8) 0.13
Where the supply of PPE is limited, prioritization is done for staff
caring for cases
49 (72.1) 8 (11.8) 33 (54.1) 12 (19.7) 0.13
Stockpiling is done for essential supplies and chemoprophylaxis agents
according to national guidelines
36 (52.2) 15 (21.7) 22 (36.7) 22 (36.7) 0.12
A process is in place for checks on PPE and other stockpile items to
keep items current i.e. not expired by date
37 (53.6) 11 (15.9) 33 (54.1) 16 (26.2) 0.36
Table 6 Essential support services
Hospitals that (would) take
care of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Essential support services In place Action needed In place Action needed
Estimation is done for additional medical and other supplies and plan is
in place to introduce a mechanism to ensure the continuous availability
of these supplies
33 (48.5) 18 (26.5) 17 (29.3) 22 (37.9) 0.09
Methods of cleaning and disinfecting the respective areas in the healthcare
facilities are in accordance with the national guidelines and standards
51 (75.0) 5 (7.3) 44 (77.2) 3 (5.3) 0.94
Methods for the disposal of medical and nonmedical solid waste are in
accordance with the national guidelines and standards.
51 (77.3) 6 (9.1) 37 (63.8) 5 (8.6) 0.22
Cleaning and disinfection is done for reusable equipment between
patient use in accordance with current national IPC guidelines
52 (76.5) 7 (10.3) 46 (79.3) 2 (3.4) 0.26
Trained cleaning personnel are appointed for the high risk areas e.g.
Emergency department and isolation ward
33 (48.5) 17 (25.0) 24 (42.1) 15 (26.3) 0.46
Plans exist for safe disposal of human body waste (urine and faeces) into
public system–disinfection with appropriate concentration of disinfectants
OR autoclaving onsite before normal disposal process
44 (65.7) 13 (19.4) 27 (47.4) 14 (24.6) 0.13
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Table 7 Infection prevention and control practices
Hospitals that (would) take care
of EDV patients
Other hospitals Significance
Infection prevention and control practices In place Action needed In place Action needed
The IPC Department or Unit is responsible for development of
evidencebased and practical IPC guidelines for the institution or
publication and dissemination of the current national guidelines or
international guidelines if local guidelines are not available
43 (65.2) 11 (16.7) 40 (68.9) 7 (12.1) 0.84
Isolation areas/rooms for examination of suspect cases are identified in
clinical areas (inpatient and outpatient)
46 (68.7) 12 (17.9) 40 (68.9) 7 (12.1) 0.66
Staff are aware of the process for safe movement of suspect patient
from point of identification to examination area/room for review
47 (70.1) 7 (10.4) 32 (56.1) 9 (15.8) 0.34
Isolation rooms/ward is available for use at all times in case of a
suspect or probable case
50 (74.6) 11 (16.4) 34 (58.6) 8 (13.8) 0.13
Isolation rooms should ideally be adequately ventilated single rooms
(optimally ≥12 air changes per hour) and negative pressure for aerosol
generating procedures, with anteroom
38 (56.7) 22 (32.8) 20 (34.5) 23 (39.7) 0.07
Process is in place for regular monitoring of the pressure and
ventilation of the isolation rooms to ensure good maintenance ready
for use
33 (49.2) 25 (37.3) 21 (36.8) 24 (42.1) 0.58
There is clear identification of and restriction to the rooms, routes and
buildings used in connection with patient care of patients with
suspected and probable EVD
37 (55.2) 21 (31.3) 25 (43.1) 18 (31.0) 0.42
Number of visitors is limited to those essential for patient support and
they take the same IPC precautions as the healthcare workers
50 (74.6) 10 (14.9) 33 (56.9) 13 (22.4) 0.12
Medical/surgical masks are provided to all suspected and confirmed
cases during transport
53 (80.3) 6 (9.1) 39 (67.2) 9 (15.5) 0.04
A particulate respirator is used during aerosolgenerating procedures
(e.g. aspiration of respiratory tract, intubation, resuscitation, collection
of nasopharyngeal swab/aspirate, bronchoscopy, autopsy).
37 (55.2) 16 (23.8) 24 (41.3) 20 (34.5) 0.26
PAPR is available when needed (as alternative to N95 mask for
healthcare workers who fail to fit) and who have been adequately
trained in their use, and decontamination
25 (37.9) 29 (43.9) 9 (15.5) 32 (55.2) 0.01
Compliance to IPC guidelines related to handling laboratory
specimens is audited regularly with timely feedback to stakeholders
for prompt correction actions to be taken
30 (44.8) 16 (23.9) 22 (39.9) 16 (27.6) 0.65
Compliance to IPC guidelines related to food preparation is audited
regularly with timely feedback to stakeholders for prompt correction
actions to be taken
24 (36.9) 22 (33.8) 28 (49.1) 18 (31.6) 0.33
Compliance to IPC guidelines related to laundry and cleaning services
is audited regularly with timely feedback to stakeholders for prompt
correction actions to be taken
36 (56.2) 15 (23.4) 29 (50.9) 13 (22.8) 0.85
Compliance to IPC guidelines related to waste management is audited
regularly with timely feedback to stakeholders for prompt correction
actions to be taken
43 (66.2) 10 (15.4) 32 (56.1) 10 (17.5) 0.48
The sequence in putting on and removal of PPE is developed 44 (67.7) 8 (12.3) 32 (56.1) 6 (10.5) 0.2
Adequate alcohol hand rub agents are provided at point of care areas
for use of healthcare workers
44 (68.7) 16 (25.0) 44 (77.2) 9 (15.8) 0.48
Hand moisturizer is freely accessible for use of healthcare workers to
help maintain skin integrity on hands
29 (45.3) 28 (43.7) 32 (56.1) 20 (35.1) 0.52
Spill kits complete with absorbent pads and disinfectants are freely
accessible in the isolation rooms for timely and prompt use by
healthcare workers when required
26 (39.4) 29 (43.9) 17 (30.4) 23 (41.1) 0.18
Healthcare workers are familiar with steps for management of spills
and competent in safe execution of these steps
39 (59.1) 9 (13.6) 28 (49.1) 8 (14.0) 0.41
Staff working in high risk areas (Emergency Department, Isolation
Wards) work as a team in looking out for each other on integrity of
PPE during use, safe removal and compliance to IPC guidelines
38 (58.5) 11 (16.9) 29 (50.9) 12 (21.0) 0.73
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renal failure due to EVD in only 15 (23 %). In only 18 hos-
pitals (27 %), is a process is in place for fast tracking access
to any new therapeutics which might become available for
the treatment or chemo-prophylaxis of EVD (Table 8).
This is a concern given the limitations of current clinical
trials on EVD vaccines and therapeutics in West Africa.
Discussion
After WHO’s Public Health Emergency of International
Concern (PHEIC) declaration on 8th August 2014, plans
and strategies for the early recognition and management
of EVD patients were activated in several countries around
the globe. Our group’s EVD Infection Control prepared-
ness questionnaire was compiled so as to assess the level of
preparedness of hospitals in Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia,
North and South America at that time. The level of pre-
paredness was assessed on a hospital level rather than on a
nationwide scale to better understand what was needed
at a more micro level in different hospitals. This survey
explored the hospitals’ preparedness levels from the
medical professionals perspectives, in several countries.
No responses were obtained from the three affected coun-
tries with widespread and intense EVD transmission.
Moreover, 6 countries (Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain,
United Kingdom and USA) have previously reported a
case or cases imported from a country with intense EVD
transmission. Our survey reported on participating hos-
pitals from Nigeria (n = 3), United Kingdom (n = 9) and
USA (n = 3) only, with no respondents from other coun-
tries. As the number of respondents differed substantially
with low numbers in Nigeria and USA, results should be
interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, whilst UK and USA
have many of the preparedness activities implemented, re-
sponses from Nigeria indicate lack of essential PPE and
lack of periodical training to ensure staff competency and
safety in use of PPE.
The EVD transmission cases in healthcare workers in
Spain and US have demonstrated the absolute need for
adequate training of healthcare workers in correct PPE
donning and doffing sequences as well as in developed
countries. Of note, in a recent survey of preparedness for
admission of EVD patients in European hospitals, the au-
thors identified a high proportion of hospitals (27 %) not
Table 7 Infection prevention and control practices (Continued)
Where applicable, for patients discharged home following recovery
from an infectious disease, family members are instructed on the
appropriate IPC measures to be taken at home
30 (45.4) 21 (31.8) 24 (42.1) 14 (24.5) 0.55
Contact tracing teams are trained and competent in contact tracing
methodology
39 (59.1) 14 (21.2) 33 (57.9) 14 (24.6) 0.39
Policy is in place for exposure management of staff and this includes
investigations, quarantine/sick leave
31 (46.9) 19 (28.8) 26 (45.6) 16 (28.1) 0.94
Healthcare workers are familiar with steps in reporting of exposures 51 (77.3) 7 (10.6) 40 (70.2) 4 (7.0) 0.27
Policy is in place for safe after death management such as use of
body bag, cleaning of corpse at clinical area
32 (48.5) 19 (28.8) 21 (36.8) 19 (33.3) 0.36
Table 8 Clinical management of patients
Hospitals that (would) take
care of EDV patients
Other hospitals
Clinical management of patients In place Action needed In place Action needed Significance
Clinicians especially frontline clinicians in the ICU and EMDs are trained in
recognizing the characteristics of patients with EVD
41 (62.1) 6 (9.1) 29 (52.7) 9 (16.4) 0.38
Clinicians are aware of the basic principles of supportive clinical care for
patients with EVD
48 (72.7) 4 (6.1) 29 (51.8) 14 (25.0) < 0.01
Laboratories have protocols in place for the detection of EVD 40 (61.5) 12 (18.5) 25 (44.6) 15 (26.8) 0.31
Laboratories have protocols for the diagnosis of fever in travelers returning
from West Africa in particular ruling out malaria and typhoid promptly
37 (56.1) 16 (24.2) 34 (60.7) 8 (14.3) 0.43
ICU facilities are available for patients with suspected and probable EVD to
receive the best supportive care
31 (47.7) 23 (35.4) 14 (25.0) 20 (35.7) 0.21
Renal replacement therapy is available for patients with renal failure due
to EVD
15 (22.7) 29 (43.9) 9 (16.1) 22 (39.3) 0.77
A process is in place for fast tracking access to any new therapeutics which
might become available for treatment or chemoprophylaxis of EVD
18 (27.3) 30 (45.5) 1 (1.8) 31 (56.4) < 0.01
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having performed training for healthcare workers’ putting
on and removal of PPE through safe methods [6]. Compar-
able to the findings based on European hospitals (46 %),
from de Jong and colleagues [6], our survey demonstrated
that 49 % of admitting hospitals had plans in place for
regular in-house drills, testing the systems put in place. On
the other hand, only 28 % of non-admitting hospitals
would perform such exercises. Even though, EVD sus-
pected cases would subsequently be transferred to a
specialized centre, the initial examination would be per-
formed in the hospital where the patient has presented.
Therefore, even in non-admitting general hospitals, drills
may prove to be a useful tool in making healthcare workers
aware of such management protocols.
The isolation rooms with recommended standards of
negative pressure ventilation and the presence of anteroom
were lower both for admitting and non-admitting EVD pa-
tients (57 % and 34 %) when compared to the survey of 48
highly infectious diseases units in 16 European countries
(100 and 90 %) and also the recent survey in 14 European
countries (87 and 69 % respectively). This indicates some
of the global inequalities with regards to healthcare re-
sources between North and South [6, 7].
At the time of the survey, a substantial proportion of
EVD admitting hospitals lacked high-care settings such
as ICU and renal facilities (action needed: 35 and 44 %
versus 11 and 18 % still in progress, respectively). Patients
with Ebola require intensive care and renal replacement
therapy, and clinical reports have indicated that improved
supportive care ameliorates patient’s chances of survival,
therefore they are essential [3]. While the questionnaire
did not assess the reason for the absence of certain mea-
sures, some hospitals might have intentionally chosen not
to offer this treatment to EVD patients, due to the in-
creased risk of exposure to blood and body fluids for the
healthcare workers. We hope that this is not the case.
With regards to laboratory preparedness our survey
did not assess the bio containment levels for processing
blood specimens for EVD diagnostics. Nevertheless, it
looked at having protocols in place for the detection of
EVD or other emerging viruses from travelers returning
from West African countries. It should be noted that 24 %
did not have protocols for diagnosis of fever in travelers
returning from West Africa and 18 % of admitting hospi-
tals did not have protocols in place for the detection of
EVD. This is clearly a cause for concern as prompt and ac-
curate recognition of cases is critical for EVD and other
emerging infectious diseases.
Soon after the emergence of SARS outbreak in 2003,
the Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the
World Health Organization, issued strong recommenda-
tions for health-care facilities on the use of respiratory
hygiene and cough etiquette as part of the standard pre-
cautions [8–10]. This survey identified that the awareness
of patients and visitors of cough etiquette and hand hy-
giene was low in both admitting and non-admitting hospi-
tals. Such basic general Infection Control measures aimed
at reducing or preventing the dissemination of infec-
tious agents from the original source should always be
in place irrespective of the threat of emerging viral
diseases including pandemic influenza or novel corona-
virus infections [10].
The unfortunate secondary EVD transmissions that
occurred in the US and in Spain, have stressed the
importance of repeated training and demonstration of
competency of healthcare workers in Infection Control
practices, particularly in PPE procedures [11, 12]. The
finding that 12 % of hospitals needed action in developing
the correct donning/doffing PPE and another 18 % are still
work in progress shows that there is a lot of room for im-
provement as well as an opportunity for international or-
ganizations to provide this training, either by webinars or
regional seminars in these countries and regions.
The WHO guidelines stress on safeguarding the well-
being of healthcare workers by making optimal provisions
for hand hygiene, PPE availability and ease of access. One
of the primary responsibilities of the employer is allowing
all the necessary equipment provisions so as to protect the
health and safety of the employees [13]. Scientific evidence
indicates alcohol hand rub is more effective, it saves time
and provides better hand hygiene compliance when com-
pared with hand washing with soap and water [14, 15].
Nevertheless, in our survey, alcohol-based hand rub avail-
ability at point of care was lacking in 25 % of EVD admit-
ting hospitals and 16 % of hospitals who would transfer
EVD suspected cases to a specialized centre. Moreover, at
the time of this survey both admitting and non-admitting
hospitals lacked spill kits in considerable amounts (44 and
41 % respectively). This is a concern given the global ef-
forts to disseminate the WHO hand hygiene formulation
to even very low resource settings.
The ease of accessibility to PPE in hospitals only provid-
ing immediate care to suspected EVD cases which are then
transferred to other centers was lacking in 10 % of these
hospitals, whilst in 21 % this was still in progress. PPE must
be available and accessible to all healthcare workers at all
times. The US CDC recommends healthcare facilities use a
powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) or an N95 respir-
ator in the event of an unexpected aerosol-generating pro-
cedure [16]. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the
availability of PAPR as an alternative to N-95 for healthcare
workers failing the fit test was only available in 38 % of
EVD admitting hospitals.
The need for ameliorated global preparedness for emer-
ging infectious diseases outbreaks has been identified here.
In order to save lives and protect healthcare workers, it is
vital for healthcare facilities to make available essential
equipment in some countries and ensure that standardized
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training with regular competency assessments on use of
PPE and the removal sequence is implemented on an inter-
national level.
A major limitation of our survey is that even though
we had respondents from the majority of continents and
countries, the survey results may not be fully represen-
tative of medical professionals and hospitals across the
globe for a number of reasons. The geographical distri-
bution of survey participants might not have contrib-
uted equally and may not be fully representative of
global hospitals due to limited or unavailable partici-
pants from some areas, such as the three countries
heavily affected by the Ebola outbreak (Liberia, Guinea
and Sierra Leone). Whilst, there were high numbers of
responses from Zimbabwe, Singapore, Australia, Croatia
and Switzerland suggesting overrepresentation of findings
from these countries, there were only 3 respondents from
West African country of Nigeria. The number of respon-
dents from each different country was small, affecting
generalizability of results from this survey. Since, respon-
dents were not limited to one per hospital there could
have been over-representation from some hospitals or
countries. It would have been ideal to have a fair distribu-
tion of respondents for the various regions of the conti-
nents since the majority of respondents from Africa were
from Southern Africa which is not representative of the
whole African population. In addition, the authors
recommend that a follow-up of this survey is made by
addressing the Ebola outbreak affected countries expli-
citly. Findings from such survey would add substantial
contributions to current knowledge.
Another limitation in this article is the time gap be-
tween data collection and publication hence; during the
period elapsed facilities might have made other imple-
mentation changes in their preparedness. Despite these
limitations and the resulting uncertainties, the results
presented here help us to understand the importance for
infection prevention. Our survey depicts issues which
have not been previously reported in the literature such
as lack of guidelines for healthcare workers exposed to
infectious agents, accommodation of healthcare workers
during an outbreak and psychological support for sus-
pected healthcare workers exposed to EVD.
In conclusion, data provided as well as the checklist it-
self, may support various hospitals around the globe to
assess their preparedness level whilst taking the neces-
sary actions to address gaps in their preparedness. This
survey is one of the first surveys to represent a global
snapshot of infection prevention practices that have
been put in place in the preparedness of healthcare facil-
ities for a potential EVD case. It offers an important tool
for assessing hospitals’ preparedness to EVD or other
new emerging pathogens in a comprehensive manner. In
order to save lives and protect healthcare workers in
hazardous environments, the international community
needs to strengthen its support to affected countries by
continuing to share experiences, provide training, per-
form competency assessments and provide basic neces-
sary supplies. This survey revealed that, despite most of
the facilities having EVD plans for implementation in
place, shortcomings in preparedness have been identified.
Basic Infection prevention recommendations are often
lacking but most importantly the actual application of rec-
ommended guidelines sometimes falls short. These obser-
vations point to immediate priorities for control, training
and equipping in particular for low resourced countries
around the globe. The general preparedness levels, for the
management of potentially suspected cases of Ebola virus
disease is only partially adequate in some hospitals. In
addition, the findings from this article emphasize the need
for global preparedness plan/ protocol implementation
order to control EVD and other emerging diseases as well
as preventing diseases transmission to HCWs.
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